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MASSON V. NEw YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.: QUOTES, LIES AND
AUDIOTAPE
DOES THE FIRST amendment provide journalists with "the
right to deliberately alter quotations?" 1 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,2 held
2-1 that indeed, a journalist may "fabricate" quotations provided
that the published quotations are rational interpretations of am-
biguous remarks made by the "quoted" person, or that the quota-
tions do not alter the substantive content of unambiguous remarks
made by that same person.'
In 1983, The New Yorker published a two-part article writ-
ten by Janet Malcolm. The piece discussed psychoanalyst Jeffrey
Masson and his association with the Sigmund Freud Archives.
While gathering information for the article, Malcolm conducted
extensive interviews with Masson, keeping detailed notes and tape
recording most of the interview sessions.
After the article was published, Masson filed suit in federal
district court against Malcolm, The New Yorker, and Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc.5, alleging that he was libeled. Specifically, he claimed
that "Malcolm fabricated words attributed to him within quota-
tions [sic] marks, and misleadingly edited his statements."' 6 Addi-
tionally, he argued that both The New Yorker and Knopf knew of
the alleged libel prior to the respective publication dates.7
After determining that Masson did not establish actual mal-
ice,8 the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
1. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1548 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
2. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. Id. at 1539.
4. Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives-I, THE NEW YORKER,
Dec. 5, 1983, at 59; Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives-ll, THE
NEW YORKER, Dec. 12, 1983, at 60.
5. Knopf was sued because it subsequently reprinted The New Yorker article in book
form. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1536.
6. Id. Masson alleged that the statements made "him appear 'unscholarly, irresponsi-
ble, vain, [and] lacking impersonal [sic] honesty and moral integrity.'9" Id.
7. Id.
8. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1398 (N.D. Cal.
1987), afjid, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989).
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defendants. 9 Masson then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Alarcon affirmed the district court's decision,10 de-
spite a vigorous dissent from Judge Kozinski. 11 Although the Mas-
son majority may be open to criticism, its framework for dealing
with "fabricated" quotes is nevertheless an appropriate one. This
Comment argues that the rational interpretation/non-substantive
alteration standard adequately protects the first amendment rights
of the journalist, while still providing a remedy to the libel plain-
tiff should the journalist stray too far from the plaintiff's actual
words. Under this standard, a journalist does have the right to
alter quotations to a certain extent.
I. BACKGROUND
When a journalist places words within quotes, and attributes
those words to a speaker, he is representing that they are the
speaker's actual utterances. At least, that is the expectation of the
reader. 2 Nonetheless, it is common journalistic practice to "clean
up" quotes.' 3 Moreover, "as a practical matter, it is not always
possible for a reporter to be so literally accurate.""4 As a result,
the published quote is often not a verbatim account of what the
speaker said. Although some speakers might object to this treat-
ment, the first amendment protects the journalist from many ad-
verse legal consequences occasioned by the inexact nature of
reporting.' 5
9. Id. at 1397.
10. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1548.
11. Id. at 1548-70 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 1538 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
13. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting J. OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 100
(1988) ("Not to clean up quotes is to make intelligent speakers look stupid and stupid
speakers look stupider.")).
14. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting J.L. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MO-
TIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1976)).
15. "The press is ... protected from liability for inadvertent or negligent misquota-
tions by the requirement that a libel plaintiff prove reckless or deliberate conduct ....
New York Times v. Sullivan's actual malice standard protects even the reporter who negli-
gently misquotes a subject." Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The rationale
supporting this protection was accepted even the Masson dissent:
Newspapers might never be published if they were required to guarantee the
accuracy of every reported fact; time and manpower do not permit the type of
verification that would prevent all mistakes. To avoid the stifling effect of mas-
sive liability, the press is given wide berth . . .; reporters are held liable only for
deliberate falsehoods or where they act recklessly.
Id. at 1557 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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The extent of this constitutional protection, though, remains
relatively unknown. For example, it is unclear whether the plain-
tiff would have a libel claim based on the following case: in the
course of an interview with a journalist, the plaintiff says, "I un-
derstand the position taken by the terrorists, and can sympathize
with it." The published article quotes the plaintiff as saying "the
position taken by the terrorists is a reasonable one, and I wholly
support it." In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a public figure must prove actual malice - actual knowledge
of the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth - in order to re-
cover in a libel suit.l" However, the Supreme Court has not yet
considered whether actual malice can be established by a re-
porter's failure to enclose within quotation marks a verbatim ren-
dering of the plaintiff's statement.1i
Arguably, some courts have dealt with this thorny problem.
In Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.,'8 the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that a newspaper could not be sued for
libel when it published a headline in Spanish, trumpeting that a
political official had called Hispanics "cerdos," or "pigs," despite
the fact that the English-speaking official did not actually use the
word "pigs."1 9 The court based its decision on a determination
that "the headline was a rational interpretation of remarks that
bristled with ambiguities." 0 Although this case is somewhat anal-
ogous to the issue of fabricated quotes, its holding seems limited
to the facts, especially given the difficulties of translating one lan-
guage to another.21
The Second Circuit decided a similar case in Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche.22 The author of a Spanish language book quoted
Ernest Hemingway describing the plaintiff as being "dirty and a
terrible ass-licker."2 3 In publishing an English language edition,
16. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Masson court assumed without ob-
jection that the plaintiff was a public figure. Hence, the actual malice standard of New
York Times applied. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1537 (9th
Cir. 1989).
17. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
18. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 452.
21. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1555 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (construing Dunn as
applying only to translations).
22. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co.,
434 U.S. 834 (1977).
23. Id. at 914.
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the defendant "toned down"'24 the remark, quoting Hemingway as
saying, "I don't really trust [the plaintiff]."25 Plaintiff filed a libel
suit, alleging in part that the actual malice standard was satisfied
because defendant knowingly changed the quote.26 In granting
summary judgment for the defendant, the court seemingly ap-
proved of fictionalized quotations, at least to "some extent,"27 as
long as the "substantive content" of the quote was not altered.2"
This case is even less helpful than Dunn, since the alleged libel
actually decreased the defamatory impact of the original
statement.
In Carson v. Allied News Co.,29 the court ruled that state-
ments allegedly made by entertainer Johnny Carson were a "sheer
fabrication"30 on the part of the author/defendant. The Seventh
Circuit allowed the case to go to the jury, stating that journalists
could "not invent quotations and attribute them to actual per-
sons." 1 This case is also of limited precedential value, since the
defendant literally made up the quotes without having any factual
basis for the alleged conversations.
From this sparse body of law was born Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., a case which tried to provide some legal
standards for dealing with fictionalized quotations.
II. MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.
A. The Majority Opinion
After analyzing the Dunn, Hotchner, and Carson cases,32 the
majority, in an opinion by Judge Alarcon, created a standard for
dealing with libel cases in which the published quotations do not
completely match the actual statements made by the plaintiff.
Specifically, the court said that actual malice may be inferred
24. Id. at 912.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 914.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
30. Id. at 212.
31. Id. at 213.
32. The Masson court, which was obligated to apply California law in this diversity
case, also relied on Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), which it interpreted to stand for the proposition that "an
author's privilege to alter quotations is not unlimited." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989).
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"when the language attributed to the plaintiff is wholly the prod-
uct of the author's imagination.""3 However, fictionalized quota-
tions are allowed to some extent. Even though the quoted lan-
gdage does not contain the exact words used by the plaintiff, the
fabricated quotation is not evidence of actual malice if it is either
a "'rational interpretation[]' of ambiguous remarks made by a
public figure,"3 4 or does not alter the substantive content of unam-
biguous statements actually made by the plaintiff.3 5
Applying this standard, the court found that none of quota-
tions attributed to Masson could be the basis of a finding of actual
malice, and therefore affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to the defendants.3" There were a number of chal-
lenged quotations which the court discussed in light of its new
standard. For example, Malcolm quoted Masson as calling him-
self an "intellectual gigolo." 7 This phrase was not on the tape
recordings,3 8 although the tapes did reveal Masson claiming that
the "[other analysts] felt . . . I . . . was a private asset but a
33. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539 (citing Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213
(7th Cir. 1976)).
34. Id. (quoting Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 452
(3d Cir. 1987)).
35. Id. (citing Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
36. The court also refused to find The New Yorker and Knopf vicariously liable for
Malcolm's actions, Id. at 1546, and denied defendants' motions for attorneys fees pursuant
to Rule I I and California law. Id. at 1547-48. Most importantly, the court rejected Mas-
son's claim that actual malice could be inferred from passages in the article which Masson
contended were edited in a misleading manner. Id. at 1544-46. In one instance, Malcolm
edited out 33 of 40 words from a remark made by Masson. Masson argued that the pub-
lished quotation ("[I was] the wrong man"), taken out of the context of his deleted com-
ments, made it look like Masson "'was the wrong man' to ask to do something honorable."
Id. at 1546. Had Malcolm not edited the remark, but published it verbatim, Masson con-
tended that it would look like Masson was declaring himself "the wrong man" to do seme-
thing for selfish reasons. The court said that "the wrong man" quote was ambiguous, and
could be interpreted several different ways. Moreover, Malcolm's interpretation of "the
wrong man" remark, reflected in her editing, was a rational one. Id. As such, editing
quotes will always be protected by the first amendment as long as the statement attributed
to the plaintiff was a rational interpretation of the plaintiff's ambiguous remarks. Thus, the
court treated the "misleading editing" claim the same way it treated the "fabricated quota-
tions" issue.
37. Id. at 1540.
38. The phrase did appear in Malcolm's interview notes. Id. Thus, there was a fac-
tual dispute - Masson claimed the quote was fabricated because it was not tape recorded,
while Malcolm claimed that she took the quote word for word from an untaped interview.
However, for the purposes of a summary judgment motion, any factual dispute is resolved
in favor of the party opposed to the motion. As such, the court assumed "that Masson did
not refer to himself as an intellectual gigolo.' Id.
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public liability. They like me. . .alone in their living room ....
[b] ut . . .within the hierarchy of analysis ...these important
• ..analysts [would not] be caught dead with me." 9 The court
held that "[w]hile it may be true that Masson did not use the
words 'intellectual gigolo,' Malcolm's interpretation did not alter
the substantive content of Masson's description of himself as a
'private asset but a public liability.' "40 Therefore actual malice
was not proved.
The analysis was similar with regard to the other quota-
tions.41 Thus, despite the fact that none of the challenged quotes
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The substantive alteration test was used on most of the other challenged quota-
tions. For example, Masson was quoted as saying that Freud's house in London would have
been "a place of sex, women, fun" had Masson moved in. Although this statement did not
appear in the tape recordings, the attributed quote did not alter the substance of other
Masson comments, such as a remark that he envisioned the home as a place for wild par-
ties, and boasts about his sexual prowess. The attributed quote, reasoned the court, was
consistent with those comments. Id. at 1542. In another example, Malcolm quoted Masson
as saying he would be considered, "after Freud, . . . the greatest analyst who ever lived."
Id. Once again, this quotation does not appear in the taped interview. However, "[t]he
purportedly fictionalized quotation actually reflects the substance of Masson's" remarks,
which included statements that "'for better or worse, analysis stands or falls with n'z now;'
'it's me and Freud against the rest of the analytic world. . . .Not so, it's me. It's me
alone'; and '[I] could single-handedly bring down the business [of Freudian psychology].'"
Id.
Only once did the court apply the "rational interpretation of ambiguous remarks" test
to one of the allegedly fabricated quotes. The challenged quotation concerned the Schreber
case study. Schreber was an Austrian who wrote a book about his delusions, including a
delusion that his psychiatrist, Flechsig, wanted to castrate him. Based on Schreber's book,
Sigmund Freud conducted a case study which formed the basis of Freud's theory on homo-
sexuality. Id. at 1543. In going through Freud's papers, Masson discovered an article writ-
ten by Flechsig describing experimental castrations he had performed. Once Masson deter-
mined that Freud received the article before finishing the Schreber study, Id., Masson
formulated the belief "that Freud knew Schreber's concerns about castration had some
basis in reality prior to his publication of the . . . case study." Id. at 1544.
Malcolm quoted Masson as saying that Eissler [another analyst] would have admitted
that he [Masson] "was right" in this belief. Masson contended he never said that, although
the statement, "He [Eissler] agrees with me, of course," did appear on tape. Id. This com-
ment appeared at the end of a protracted conversation on the subject of the Schreber case
study, and the court noted that "[i]t is difficult to discern [based on the recorded conversa-
tion] whether Masson is claiming that Eissler 'agrees' with" Masson's current belief that
Freud knew that Flechsig performed castrations at the time [Freud] published his case
study, or that Eissler 'agrees' with Masson's statement that Freud did not know that
Schreber had a basis in reality for some of his other delusions. Id.
The court held that the quote Malcolm attributed to Masson was "a rational interpre-
tation of Masson's ambiguous remarks about Eissler's reactions to his discoveries about the
Schreber case." Id. Therefore, Masson failed to present evidence of actual malice.
With regards to the issue of misleadingly edited quotes, the court used the "rational
[Vol. 40:875
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was actually said by Masson, the court held that the fabrications
were close enough to reality to affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kozinski filed a vigorous dissent in the Masson case,
declaring that whatever responsibility the courts have to safeguard
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press, "the right
to deliberately alter quotations is not . . . a concomitant of a free
press." '42
Judge Kozinski agreed with the majority that actual malice
must be proven, but differed as to how it must be proven. He pro-
vided a framework for evaluating fabricated quotes, and using
that standard, found that the plaintiff's case should have been al-
lowed to go to a jury.43
Before developing his own approach to the issue of fabricated
quotes, Judge Kozinski first criticized the majority opinion. In es-
sence, Judge Kozinski argued that the standard set forth by the
majority imposed "no meaningful bounds" '44 upon the journalist.
Under the majority approach, for example, if an interviewee made
"statements that could reasonably be construed as boastful or ar-
rogant (or callous or stupid or reflecting any other trait of charac-
ter or intellect) the reporter may attribute to [the speaker] any
other statement reflecting that same trait."'45 Thus given a "li-
cense to invent quotations on the basis of what they perceive to be
a speaker's character, there are no words whatsoever that [report-
ers] cannot put into a subject's mouth."46
If a writer actually put words into her subject's mouth, she
crosses "the line between poetic license and license. The latter the
first amendment does not protect. 47 However, Judge Kozinski
largely based his constitutional determination on the fact that
fabricating quotes is simply bad journalism: "Unlike my col-
leagues, I am unable to construe the first amendment as granting
journalists a privilege to engage in practices they themselves
interpretation of ambiguous remarks" test more often. See supra note 36 and text accom-
panying note 34.
42. Id. at 1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 1562-70 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1554 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1550 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1553 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1554 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
frown upon, practices one of our defendants has flatly disowned as
journalistic heresy."48 Unfortunately, "journalistic heresy" does
not necessarily violate the first amendment. Even Judge Kozinski
himself admitted that the "standards and aspirations of the [jour-
nalistic] profession are not, of course, dispositive of the iegal ques-
tion [of fabricated quotes].""
Displeased with the majority test, Judge Kozinski formulated
his own. Arguing that no cases were precisely on point, 50 the dis-
sent based its standard on the twin first amendment policies es-
poused in New York Times v. Sullivan: protecting journalists
from mistakes of fact and judgment.51 Taking the easy case first,
Judge Kozinski asserted that the right to fabricate quotes does not
serve the policy of protecting the press from errors of fact, since
the press already possesses sufficient protection in this regard.52
Regarding mistakes in judgment, Judge Kozinski took the position
that "changing the language of quotations is the type of judg-
ment" which is not "important to the operation of a free and ro-
bust press[.] ' The rationale for this determination was again the
general opinion in journalistic circles that, for the most part,
fabrication of quotes is unacceptable.
The test established by Judge Kozinski to evaluate cases like
Masson involves a five-step inquiry: "(1) Does the quoted material
purport to be a verbatim repetition of what the speaker said? (2)
If so, is it inacurate? (3) If so, is the inaccuracy material? (4) If
48. Id. at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). "It is never justifiable for a journalist to
make up quotations, however plausible or characteristic .... " Id. at 1553 (quoting J.L.
HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS 64 (1981)). In discussing the "great-
est analyst who ever lived" quote, see supra note 41, Judge Kozinski states that "using [a
statement] and other snatches as yarn from which to weave a wholly different statement to
be passed off as a quote from Masson is a power few self-respecting journalists arrogate to
themselves." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
49. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1557 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1558 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski added:
The press is already protected from liability for inadvertant or negligent misquo-
tations by the requirement that a libel plaintiff prove reckless or deliberate con-
duct. Thus, if a reporter takes notes and is unable to catch every word, she will
be protected from liability even though she was negligent in failing to use a tape
recorder or in double-checking her source. New York Times v. Sullivan's actual
malice standard protects even the reporter who negligently misquotes a subject.
Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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so, is the inaccuracy defamatory? (5) If so, is the inaccuracy a
result of malice. . .?'" If all five questions are answered affirma-
tively, the case should be sent to the jury.
Using this standard, Judge Kozinski concluded that Masson
should have been allowed to present his claims against all three
defendants to a jury. First, there was substantial evidence that
Malcolm's use of quotation marks represented that she was re-
porting precisely what Masson said. 55 Second, a straightforward
comparison between the tape recordings and the published articles
indicated inaccuracies.56 Third, the changes between the record-
ings and the article were not "merely cosmetic or immaterial. '57
Fourth, as a matter of state law, California recognizes that mis-
quotations can be defamatory and actionable.5 8 Finally, Judge
Kozinski said that all three defendants could have been found to
have acted with actual malice - Malcolm because she had the
opportunity to check the quotations in her article against the tape
recordings in her possession, 59 The New Yorker because it failed
to follow up on Masson's protestations that he had been mis-
quoted, 60 and Knopf for its similarly "cavalier" treatment of Mas-
son's complaint.6'
After going through the analysis required by the five-step in-
quiry, Judge Kozinski concluded by once more hammering home
his main point: fabricating quotes "debases the journalistic profes-
sion as a whole. 6 2
III. ANALYSIS
Neither Judge Alarcon, writing for the majority, nor dissent-
ing Judge Kozinski, presented a perfect solution to the problem
posed by the issue of fabricated quotes. Given the nature of the
first amendment, there probably is no perfect answer. But unlike
Judge Kozinski, the majority offered an approach which should
prove workable without compromising the first amendment.
The main flaw in the majority opinion is its blind insistence
54. Id. at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1563 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1564-65 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1566-68 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1568-69 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1569-70 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1570 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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in supporting its decision with precedent.6 3 Judge Kozinski was
absolutely correct in asserting that "no cases were precisely on
point,"' 64 and that any test had to be culled from the first amend-
ment.6 5 Nonetheless, the majority produced a standard which re-
mained true to first amendment policies.
Altering quotations goes to the heart of the question of how
much leeway a journalist has in exercising editorial judgment.
Ideally, a happy medium should be struck between the uninhib-
ited editorial discretion to doctor quotes, and no discretion whatso-
ever. At the very least, the majority ended- up somewhere in the
middle of those two extremes. The fairness of the majority stan-
dard can best be illustrated by an example. A journalist interviews
a professor who says, "I am good in my field." In putting together
her article, the writer edits the quote to read, "I am the best in
my field." Presuming that the author was working from notes (ei-
ther written or tape-recorded), a libel suit filed by the professor
could be decided either way, with the court's decision hinging
upon its analysis of the notes. If the notes66 indicate that the pro-
fessor made several boastful, egotistical remarks, the court can
justifiably say that the "fabricated" quote did not alter the sub-
stantive content of what was actually said throughout the course
of the interview, or was a rational interpretation of the ambiguous
word "good." Hence, summary judgment would be granted.
On the other hand, if the professor's actual remark was an
isolated one, or was surrounded in the notes by humble rumina-
tions on his abilities, then the court would find that the writer
substantively altered or unreasonably interpreted the professor's
63. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
64. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1555-57 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
66. Implicit in the majority opinion is the idea that the court should just consider the
notes taken by the journalist during the course of the interview with her subject. A journal-
ist should not be allowed to alter her subject's quotations based on information gleaned
from other sources, such as previous interviews conducted by other journalists. Since the
writer does not know for sure that the words attributed to her subject in the alternate
sources were actually uttered, she would in essence be fabricating a quote in her own arti-
cle based on quotations that might also have been fabricated. Without first-hand knowl-
edge that the comments forming the basis of her alterations were ever made, the writer
would seem to fall under the Carson case, which prohibits inventing quotations out of thin
air. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). That the majority did not
explicitly require courts to consider only the defendant's notes in making its determination
as to whether the fabricated quotes substantively altered the actual remarks made by the
plaintiff is a flaw which needs to be corrected.
[Vol. 40:875
MASSON v. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE
actual remark. As such, malice could be inferred, and the case
might be sent to a jury. Situations which fall somewhere between
these two examples can be handled by the court on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, under the majority approach, some freedom is toler-
ated, but a journalist who ventures too far from the truth will be
punished. No more could be asked for.
Unlike the majority opinion, the dissent failed to find a mid-
dle ground in its effort to police editorial judgment. Depending on
whether the focus is on Judge Kozinski's underlying rationale or
the practical effect of his opinion, his approach can be viewed as
either giving the press free reign in altering quotations, or virtu-
ally barring the press from changing even a word.
Although Judge Kozinski described the majority rationale as
"explosive," 8 the rationale underlying his dissenting opinion is
much more explosive. Several times Judge Kozinski seemed to
predicate constitutional protection for journalists upon their com-
pliance with professional standards. 9 While there is little doubt
that Malcolm's article was bad, perhaps even unethical journal-
ism, it remains protected by the first amendment. Bad journalism
is not synonymous with libel and if the case was otherwise, courts
would be flooded with defamation suits. The majority opinion
seemed to recognize the distinction between poor and unprotected
reporting; the dissent disregarded it. Although the dissent's ration-
ale of equating constitutional protection with the quality of the
reporting is appealing in light of the Masson case, that type of
67. It could be argued that the majority test is actually very underprotective of the
press. The court's job in a libel case is essentially two-fold: to determine if a false statement
of fact was made, and then to determine whether actual malice existed. Arguably, the
majority standard collapsed these two inquiries. Thus, if a plaintiff can prove that the chal-
lenged quotation did substantively alter the content of what he said, then not only is there a
false statement of fact, but a finding of actual malice would automatically follow. The
language in the majority opinion, however, does not support this line of reasoning. The
court flatly stated that malice will not be inferred when the plaintiff fails to prove a sub-
stantive alteration or an unreasonable interpretation. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539. Presuma-
bly, this is because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a false statement of fact was ever
published. Hence, a finding of actual malice would be irrelevant. In contrast, where the
plaintiff carries his burden of proof, the court states that actual malice "may" be inferred.
Id. The use of the permissive word "may" leads to the conclusion that although the plain-
tiff has proven there was a false statement of fact, whether or not a court can find that
actual malice existed depends upon the plaintiff's production of evidence showing actual
malice. The plaintiff cannot merely rely on the fact that he satisfied the "rational interpre-
tation/non-substantive alteration" standard to prove malice.
68. Id. at 1550 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
69. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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reasoning poses a significant threat to freedom of the press.
The dissent's rationale is dangerous because rather than rely-
ing on principles of law to determine whether or not libel oc-
curred, a court will use principles of journalism. The court will
have to make a subjective determination as to what is good jour-
nalism and what is bad journalism, with their only guidance being
the professional standards of an unfamiliar profession. Thus, in
each step of Judge Kozinski's five-part inquiry,70 the court will
look to journalists themselves for answers to its questions,71 rather
than exercise its own independent judgment. For example, the de-
termination of whether an inaccuracy is "material" will be made
in compliance with guidelines established by the press. Under cur-
rent journalistic practice, a cleaned-up quote would be an immate-
rial inaccuracy, while something more would be material.7 2 But
journalism is a dynamic profession, and in the future, substan-
tially revising quotes might be considered standard operating pro-
cedure. This gives the media, through manipulation of its own
standards, the power to libel-proof itself. Therefore, it is the dis-
sent's approach, and not the majority's, which in the long run
leaves the media potentially unbounded."
Of more immediate concern than the spectre of lowered jour-
nalistic standards dictating what is and what is not protected by
the first amendment are the practical implications of Judge
Kozinski's approach: a chilling effect on the press, and a decrease
in the quality of journalism. The dissent's methodology leaves the
journalist little room to maneuver in editing quotes, since the test
Judge Kozinski sets forth7 1 is too easily met by the libel plaintiff.
Whenever a writer places something in quotes that does not
comport exactly with tape recordings or notes, the first two prongs
are met. Thus, even cleaned up quotes are swept into the realm of
libel by the initial steps of the inquiry. The answer to the fourth
part of the test is determined by state law, and it seems that in a
great number of cases misquotations could be defamatory. So long
as there were notes which potentially could have verified accuracy,
it is fair to say that the fifth part of the test is also satisfied.
70. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
71. This will be particularly so with regard to the first three parts of Judge Kozin-
ski's test.
72. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1564-65 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
73. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the key inquiry is the third step: whether the inac-
curacy identified in step two is "material." Judge Kozinski
equates "immaterial" changes with "cosmetic" changes.75 A cle-
aned-up quote might be immaterial, but virtually anything else
could be material. Faced with the choice of exercising a minimal
degree of editorial judgment and risking a costly libel trial, or wa-
tering down an article by paraphrasing (or perhaps choosing not
to write the story at all in order to avoid litigation), the "chilled"
journalist will probably find the second option more palatable and
more prudent. When such a decision is made, freedom of the press
suffers.
The quality of journalism suffers, too. Careful writers will be
reluctant to quote directly from their sources, thereby decreasing
the impact and credibility of the subsequent articles. A bland,
boring brand of journalism will develop. If journalists opt to use
quotations, their hesitation to alter them in any way will adversely
affect the flow, style, and quality of the pieces, making them more
difficult and less enjoyable to read. Moreover, the speaker could
sound unintelligent if his quotations are left unedited, since errors
made in speaking often go unnoticed, while errors in print jump
out at the reader. 8 The risk of embarrassing himself might also
make a speaker reluctant to give written interviews.
The Masson majority presents the better alternative for deal-
ing with fabricated quotations. However, something gnaws at
one's sense of fairness when a writer is allowed to fabricate quotes
which do not exactly reflect the speaker's true thoughts and
words. It seems unjust to sanction "creative editing." The short
answer to this concern is that the constitution demands such pro-
tection; without it, the press would lose much of the vitality which
makes it an important part of a free society. A better answer is
that the legal system is not the only way of controlling abuses.
The media is quite good at policing itself, evidenced by Judge
Kozinski's frequent reliance on journalists' negative opinions re-
garding fabricated quotes. Judge Kozinski recounted an incident
concerning a journalist who admitted using composite characters
and inventing conversations in allegedly non-fiction articles, with-
out informing his readers.77 A tremendous controversy in the jour-
nalistic community erupted, which resulted in the wide-spread
75. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1558 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1560-61 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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condemnation of his actions."9
Judge Kozinski found this controversy "instructive" because
"it points to the great resistance on the part of journalists and
publishers to the blurring of fact and fiction."' 9 In this regard,
Judge Kozinski is right, but she missed the underlying meaning of
the incident-journalists and publishers are quite capable of tak-
ing care of their own. Moreover, the general public most certainly
would be wary of journalists who operate on the ethical edge,
thereby inhibiting those journalists' chances for the top stories and
career advancement. These three protections - the majority stan-
dard, journalistic standards enforced by the profession itself and
public awareness - adequately protect against and deter the use
of fabricated quotations.
MICHAEL A. PAVLICK
78. Even the journalist's magazine employer, after initially supporting the writer,
eventually condemned his practices. Id. at 1561 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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